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Article
The prominent conspiracy theorist, David Icke, contends that 
problem–reaction–solution (PRS), known also as order out 
of chaos, is a device used by the powerful, social ruling elite 
to manipulate and shape public opinion with the intention of 
gaining approval for the implementation of societal controls 
(Icke, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2010) He posits that PRS involves 
three discrete, but interrelated phases (Icke, 2010). Initially, 
dominant individuals, groups, and/or organizations covertly 
engineer or exploit a problem to legitimize the enactment of 
laws, rules, and restrictions. Then, via an unquestioning 
media, the issue is broadcast, amplified, and popularized. 
Bringing the problem to the forefront of public attention 
arouses a strong social demand for action (reaction), which 
advances acceptance of a “predetermined” solution (Icke, 
2005, 2010). According to Icke, PRS via this process insti-
gates social change, legitimizes centralized power, and 
increases hegemonic authority (Icke, 2003, 2005, 2007, 
2010). Concomitant with Icke’s theorizing, many conspiracy 
theorists view PRS as a propaganda technique and a power-
ful form of mind manipulation (Chomsky, 2002; Robertson, 
2016).
Indeed, Chomsky (2002) contends that the role of the 
media is to misinform rather than inform. Chomsky (2002) 
posits that the media, via a continuous flood of distractions 
and insignificant information, generates representations of 
the world, which are divorced from reality. These inaccurate 
depictions divert public attention away from potentially neg-
ative changes advanced by political and economic elites. An 
important strategy within the PRS process is to forward 
problems, and then provide solutions (Lincenyi & Tamene, 
2013). Specifically according to Chomsky (2002), the media 
focuses on an issue (problem) to evoke a strong audience 
reaction with the intention of gaining acceptance for a preset 
solution. For instance, manufacture an economic crisis, to 
curtail social rights and reduce public services. Within this 
context, the “problem” produces anxiety, which motivates 
support (gains public consensus and general consent) for the 
preordained solution. Hence, fear and anxiety are key drivers 
within the PRS process (Lincenyi & Tamene, 2013).
A contemporary, real-world example of PRS is a false 
(black) flag operation (McMinn, 2017). This is a covert plan, 
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designed to deceive by mendaciously attributing actions to 
entities, groups, or individuals (Icke, 2005). A classic, fre-
quently cited illustration is Operation Northwoods (1962) 
(see Durham, 2014; Knight, 2008), where U.S. military offi-
cials planned self-directed attacks on the American state with 
the intention of blaming Cuba (Knight, 2008). The U.S. offi-
cials involved believed that perceived Cuban culpability 
would provide justification and support for an otherwise 
publicly unacceptable conflict between the two countries 
(Durham, 2014).
A key feature of the final phase of PRS is that the stated 
resolution is typically unduly radical (Icke, 2003). 
Accordingly, moderation of the solution in the face of sig-
nificant opposition appeases critics, creates a false impres-
sion of reasonableness, and provides a platform for the 
introduction of further measures (Icke, 2003). Within con-
spiracy canon, PRS exists concurrently with “the totalitarian 
tiptoe” (Icke, 2003, 2007). This term denotes the notion that 
the stealthy, systematic implementation of linked, minor 
changes over time incrementally produces major social 
transformation (Icke, 2003, 2007).
Although, the precise lineage of PRS is unknown, 
researchers often ascribe the origin of PRS to various ancient 
figures or events (i.e., Roman Emperor Diocletian) and phil-
osophical doctrines (Hegel, 1812; see Fichte, 1794, in 
Neuhouser, 1990). In this historical context, PRS comprises 
three stages equivalent to those subsumed within PRS: thesis 
(intellectual proposition, problem), antithesis (negation of 
the proposition, response to thesis), and synthesis (resolution 
of tension between proposition and reaction, resolution). 
These steps derive from Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus misin-
terpretation (Carlson, 2007) of Hegel’s dialectic (Mills, 
2005; Stewart, 1996). The exact source and academic status 
of PRS is unclear and beyond the remit of this article, which 
generally views PRS as a form of faulty inferential thinking. 
More precisely, as the tendency to validate proffered subop-
timal solutions based on limited evaluation of objective 
evidence.
Considering the cognitive bases of PRS further, in some 
circumstances, endorsement of the proposed solution derives 
from a chain of reasoning related to the reaction to the solu-
tion, and then the solution to the reaction. In this context, 
PRS endorsement follows valid inferential reasoning rules 
and does not denote problematic reasoning (Faust, 1984). 
Within propositional logic, the modus ponens describes a 
rule of inference given the validity of a set of premises 
(Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992). Modus ponens 
applies to the reasoning embodied in many PRS scenarios. In 
these cases, problems in reasoning arise only when the prem-
ises related to an argument, or its conclusions are either 
unfounded or inappropriately presented as valid. From a con-
spiratorial perspective, issues arise because solutions derive 
from premises fashioned by those in charge of constructing 
and/or maintaining social reality, rather than the rules of 
logic (e.g., Althusser, 2014; Eagleton, 1991).
For example, terrorism is a major threat to personal and 
societal well-being (problem). An appropriate reaction to this 
statement is to express concern for potential victims (response). 
In this instance, a proportionate government or state-regulatory 
reaction is to insist that citizens are in need of protection 
(solution). Stated in formal logical terms, this equates to a 
modus ponens form of argument, if A (a terrorist attack occurs) 
then B (the state needs to intervene to protect citizens). 
Acceptance of this statement arises from the observation that 
the solution cogently follows the problem. However, the reac-
tion, in this instance, does not actually prescribe the solution. In 
this context, ideological state apparatuses may influence belief 
systems at a societal level (Althusser, 2014). This process 
advocates certain “normal” and “natural” solutions and rejects 
others. Thus, conspiracies arise when individuals question pre-
vailing views and consider that proposed solutions mask real 
objectives. In this example, increased surveillance is advocated 
and normalized.
Typically, problems defined by the PRS framework are 
general and proposed solutions specific. Hence, solution 
acceptance originates not from logical deduction per se, but 
rather the perception of resolutions as “rational.” Accordingly, 
ideology influences perception of what is appropriate 
(Chomsky, 2002). Conspiracies arise when theorists posit 
causes and solutions that differ from those recommended by 
current ideological practices.
Furthermore, the inherent emotive content of PRS sce-
narios (i.e., fear, anxiety, and anger) may undermine critical 
evaluation of premises and solutions by facilitating affective 
rather than analytical consideration of arguments. 
Consequently, solutions derived from PRS scenarios often 
receive less critical scrutiny (see Pham, 2007). Moreover, 
within PRS scenarios, structure places an emphasis on issue 
resolution (solution focus) rather than logic (Icke, 2003, 
2007). This is consistent with everyday dilemmas that spon-
taneously induce emotional responses and are generally 
resolved via affect-driven decision making (Haidt, 2001).
Affective decisions are inherently less analytically evalu-
ative because they are automatic and use fewer cognitive 
resources (Epstein, 1990). In support of the supposition that 
affect influences appraisal of information creditability, previ-
ous work reports that emotional rather than rational appeal 
informs validation of beliefs (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & 
Heier, 1996). This applies also to belief in the paranormal 
(Dudley, 2000; Irwin, Dagnall, & Drinkwater, 2012). 
Furthermore, research suggests that affective appeal plays an 
important role in the acceptance of pseudoscientific claims 
(Lindeman, 1998). This notion draws on Irwin’s (2009) defi-
nition of paranormal belief as,
a proposition that has not been empirically attested to the 
satisfaction of the scientific establishment but is generated 
within the nonscientific community and extensively endorsed 
by people who might normally be expected by their society to be 
capable of rational thought and reality testing. (pp. 16-17).
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PRS endorsement, at least superficially, shares key features 
with belief in the paranormal. Particularly, PRS validation 
defies logic, ensues in the absence of supporting scientific 
evidence, and occurs within individuals who are typically 
capable of reality testing. To facilitate comparisons with 
belief in the paranormal, a measure of paranormal belief was 
included alongside PRS within this article. A further advan-
tage of including belief in the paranormal is that the con-
struct is also associated with flawed probabilistic reasoning 
(Dagnall, Parker, & Munley, 2007; Wierzbicki, 1985).
To date, there has been no psychological examination of 
PRS. Certainly, the authors are not aware of any psychologi-
cal studies. The present study bridged this gap in the litera-
ture and was congruent with the recent surge of interest in 
conspiratorial ideation and its potential societal importance. 
The lack of research into PRS reflects the fact that psycho-
logical researchers and publications are often reluctant to 
consider the legitimacy of phenomena that is located outside 
traditional academic literature. Investigation of PRS is 
required because the concept frequently surfaces within con-
spiracy theory narrative and is widely disseminated by pseu-
doscientists (Icke, 2003, 2007). Therefore, it is vital to assess 
the psychological legitimacy of PRS and its potential social 
impact. Acknowledging this important omission, the present 
study examined the extent to which wrongly inferred causa-
tion and affect-driven decision making explained endorse-
ment of PRS scenarios. Correspondingly, measures of 
probabilistic reasoning ability (susceptibility to statistical 
bias), paranormal belief, and emotion-based reasoning were 
included.
It was important to incorporate reasoning measures 
because recent studies have demonstrated that endorsement 
of unconventional beliefs (i.e., paranormal and conspiracy 
theories) is associated with statistical bias (Dagnall, Denovan, 
Drinkwater, Parker, & Clough, 2017; Dagnall, Drinkwater, 
Denovan, Parker, & Rowley, 2016; Dagnall, Drinkwater, 
Parker, & Rowley, 2014; Dagnall et al., 2007). Explicitly, 
misperception of chance best predicts belief in the paranor-
mal (Dagnall et al., 2007), whereas propensity to conjunction 
error most strongly explains endorsement of conspiracy the-
ories (Brotherton & French, 2014; Dagnall et al., 2017). 
Belief in the paranormal relates also to conjunction (Rogers, 
Davis, & Fisk, 2009; Rogers, Fisk, & Lowrie, 2016; Rogers, 
Fisk, & Wiltshire, 2011); however, the effect is weaker and 
largely attributable to misperception of chance (Dagnall, 
Drinkwater, et al., 2016; Dagnall et al., 2014). Hence, 
misperception of chance is associated with both dimensions 
of the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (New Age Philosophy 
[NAP] and Traditional Paranormal Beliefs [TPB]), whereas 
conjunction correlates only with Traditional Paranormal 
Beliefs. Acknowledging preceding work, both perception of 
randomness and proneness to conjunction fallacy were 
included as measures of statistical bias.
The current research article assessed the degree to which 
PRS endorsement was explicable in terms of statistical bias 
and emotion-based reasoning. Due to a dearth of previous 
work in the area of PRS, hypotheses were exploratory and 
tentatively stated. Accordingly, conclusions about PRS 
endorsement derived from consideration of intervariable 
relationships. Specifically, this study reasoned that different 
outcomes would indicate which psychological factors best 
explained PRS. If validation arose from wrongly inferred 
relationships between argument premises, then a stronger 
relationship would be evident with statistical bias (vs. emo-
tional-based reasoning). With regard to specific statistical 
biases, the nature of PRS problems suggested that proneness 
to conjunction (vs. perception of randomness) would most 
strongly predict endorsement. This predication arose from 
the observation that PRS acceptance involves associative 
linking of components (problem, reaction, and solution), so 
that the premises appear rationally connected.
Alternatively, a stronger association with emotional-
based reasoning (vs. statistical bias) would indicate that PRS 
solution ratification derived from the affective appeal of 
statements, although acceptance of PRS solutions and belief 
in the paranormal appear to share key characteristics (defi-
ance of logic, validation of notions without scientific evi-
dence, and attributable to subjective interpretation). The two 
constructs also differ. For instance, PRS content refers to 
real-world everyday topics and issues, which people regu-
larly encounter and widely discuss across a range of political 
and social fora. Paranormal beliefs, in contrast, are more eso-
teric and abstract. Hence, the authors anticipated only a weak 
positive correlation between the two factors.
Method
Participants
Two hundred forty-eight respondents from the Manchester 
Metropolitan University, Faculty of Health, Psychology and 
Social Care, and the local community completed measures. 
Age ranged from 18 to 71 years (M = 26.65, SD = 9.77). The 
sample comprised 180 females (73%), age range = 18 to 71 
years (M = 25.94, SD = 9.51); and 68 males (27%), age range 
= 20 to 59 years (M = 28.51, SD = 10.24). The majority of 
participants were students (72%). Within the student group, 
86% were undergraduates and 14% postgraduates. If poten-
tial participants were younger than 18 years of age, or 
declared they had previously studied heuristic bias, involve-
ment discontinued. These were the only exclusion criteria.
Materials and Procedure
PRS. Ten scenarios featuring a range of contemporary issues 
(illegal downloading, adult Internet material, criminal record 
checks, CCTV surveillance, DNA database, countries sup-
porting terrorism, airport security, movement of foreign 
nationals, monitoring emails, and global warming) assessed 
propensity to PRS. Each scenario comprised two statements. 
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The first specified an issue (problem) and related it to a major 
social concern (reaction), and the second advocated an action 
(solution). For example, “crime is a regular feature of every-
day life (problem), we are all potentially victims (reaction). To 
protect society and the individual CCTV and routine surveil-
lance are necessary (solution).” Following consideration of 
each scenario, respondents recorded their agreement to the 
proposed solution on a 7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 
1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. Hence, possible 
score on the PRS scenarios ranged from 10 to 70, high scores 
denoted high levels of support for advocated solutions. In this 
study, alpha reliability of the PRS measure was satisfactory (α 
= .86) with an acceptable mean interitem correlation of .38. 
Clark and Watson (1995) suggest that an acceptable mean int-
eritem correlation falls between .15 and .50.
Emotion-based reasoning. The six-item subscale of the Cogni-
tive Biases Questionnaire (CBQ; Peters et al., 2014) assessed 
emotion-based reasoning. The subscale functions as a stand-
alone measure indexing the degree to which emotional rather 
than rational appeal informs decision making (Irwin et al., 
2012). For each item, respondents read a short vignette and 
endorsed one of three options, the option best describing 
how they felt about the situation. Responses were rated on a 
3-point scale (1 = absence of bias, 2 = presence of bias with 
some qualification, and 3 = presence of bias). For example, 
“Imagine you are watching the news on TV about a recent 
disaster, and you find yourself feeling guilty.” Responses to 
this item in accordance with the response scale were, “It’s 
normal to feel guilty when a disaster has happened to some-
one else”; “I wonder why I feel guilty, maybe I’m unwit-
tingly responsible in some way”; and “I feel guilty I must be 
responsible in some way.” Overall, scores ranged from 6 to 
18, with high scores indicating presence of bias. The CBQ 
possesses good psychometric properties (test–retest reliabil-
ity and Cronbach’s α = .89). In this study, alpha was slightly 
below the threshold of .7 (α = .63); however, the scale pos-
sessed a satisfactory mean interitem correlation of .22.
Belief in the paranormal. The Revised Paranormal Belief 
Scale (Tobacyk, 1988; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983) is the most 
commonly used measure of paranormal belief (Goulding & 
Parker, 2001). It assesses belief in the paranormal via com-
pletion of 26 self-report items. Items appear as statements 
(e.g., “There is a devil”) and respondents designate agree-
ment on a 7-point Likert-type scale (ranging from 1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Statements index 
seven dimensions of paranormal belief: traditional religious 
belief, psi, witchcraft, superstition, spiritualism, extraordi-
nary life forms, and precognition. The Revised Paranormal 
Belief Scale is a conceptually and psychometrically satisfac-
tory measure of paranormal belief possessing adequate reli-
ability and validity (Tobacyk, 2004).
The nature and number of the belief dimensions, however, 
have received criticism (Lawrence, 1995a, 1995b; Lawrence, 
Roe, & Williams, 1997). Consequently, Lange, Irwin, and 
Houran (2000) performed a purification of the Revised 
Paranormal Belief Scale, which identified a superior two-
factor solution based on belief function (individual vs. 
social). This comprised New Age Philosophy (NAP) and 
Traditional Paranormal Beliefs (TPB). NAP contains 11 
items evaluating belief in psi and survival of bodily death. 
The factor reflects the degree to which beliefs impart control 
over external events (Irwin, 1992). TPB possesses five items 
measuring belief in the devil, witchcraft, heaven, and hell. 
TPB regulates social and cultural factors (Goode, 2000). 
Calculation of NAP and TPB scores requires item recoding 
(0-6; see Lange et al., 2000), higher scores reflecting para-
normal belief. Subscale scores, following Rasch transforma-
tion, range from 6.85 to 47 for NAP and 11.16 to 43.24 for 
TPB. The Revised Paranormal Belief Scale demonstrates 
excellent internal reliability, Cronbach’s alpha = .94 and its 
subscales possess good internal reliability (NAP, α = .88 and 
TPB, α = .82; Dagnall, Denovan, Drinkwater, Parker, & 
Clough, 2016). In this study, alpha reliability of the total 
scale was high (α = .94) with a satisfactory mean interitem 
correlation of .37. Similarly, TPB and NAP subscales pos-
sessed high reliability (α = .82 and α = .89, respectively), 
with satisfactory mean interitem correlations of .48 and .44.
Probabilistic reasoning tasks. Arnott’s (1998, 2006) taxonomy 
of decision biases places judgments of chance (perception of 
randomness and conjunction) within a common statistical 
bias category. Participants completed 10 probabilistic rea-
soning tasks, five items assessing each bias type. Hence, 
scores for each bias ranged from 0 to 5 and the overall score 
was 0 to 10. To facilitate comparisons, raw scores appear 
alongside proportions; these represent the number of correct 
responses calculated as a fraction of percentage-hit rate. 
High scores indicate higher levels of probabilistic reasoning 
ability (absence from misperception of randomness and con-
junction error). Problems have featured within several previ-
ously published studies (Dagnall, Drinkwater, et al., 2016; 
Dagnall et al., 2014; Dagnall et al., 2007).
Perception of randomness. Items assessed participant’s ability 
to judge accurately the likelihood of strings and sequences. 
For example, “imagine a coin was tossed six times. Which 
pattern of results do you think is most likely? (a) HHHHHH, 
(b) HHHTTT, (c) HTHHTT, (d) all equally likely.” Overall 
scores indicate the degree to which participants base judg-
ments on an understanding of probability. The scale pos-
sessed an acceptable mean interitem correlation of .15. Items 
derived from Kahneman and Tversky (1973).
Conjunction fallacy. Problems comprised single component 
events (A&B) and a conjunction (both events co-occurring, 
AB). Instructions directed participants to select the most 
likely, probable outcome from the alternatives. Conjunction 
occurred if participants selected (A&B). For example, “two 
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football teams (Team A and Team B) are playing in a local 
derby. What is the most likely outcome?: (a) Team A scores 
first, (b) Team A scores first and wins, (c) Team A scores first 
and loses, (d) Team A scores first and the game is drawn.” 
Problems derived from the seminal work of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1982, 1983; that is, heart attack, Linda problem, 
cause of war, and outcome of sporting events). As with the 
perception of randomness scale, the measure possessed a sat-
isfactory mean interitem correlation of .17.
Perception of randomness and conjunction items appeared 
within a single section and randomization determined item 
order.
Procedure
Potential participants read the study outline. If they provided 
informed consent, instructions directed them to work sys-
tematically through the materials booklet. Guidelines asked 
participants to answer questions honestly and complete items 
at their own pace. The booklet contained five sections: per-
sonal information (always first), PRS, emotion-based rea-
soning, paranormal belief, and probabilistic reasoning tasks. 
To avoid order effects, order of measures rotated across par-
ticipants. On conclusion of the booklet, participants were 
debriefed.
Prior to testing, the researchers obtained ethical approval 
for the study as part of a research project examining relation-
ships between anomalous beliefs and statistical bias.
Results
Data Analysis Strategy
Data analysis progressed through a sequence of related 
phases. Initially, data screening and examination of descrip-
tive statistics confirmed normality of scores. Then, confir-
matory factor analysis and composite reliability evaluated 
measurement adequacy. Finally, structural equation model-
ing (SEM) investigated relationships between problem types 
(statistical bias: perception of randomness and conjunction 
fallacy), thinking style (emotion-based reasoning), paranor-
mal belief (Traditional Paranormal Beliefs and New Age 
Philosophy), and PRS.
Two models tested the hypothesis that problem types, 
although correlated and similarly associated with emotion-
based reasoning, would differentially predict belief in the 
paranormal and PRS. Noting that Traditional Paranormal 
Beliefs and New Age Philosophy possess different functions 
(Lange et al., 2000), models examined each paranormal fac-
tor independently; Model 1 tested Traditional Paranormal 
Beliefs and Model 2 New Age Philosophy. This approach 
was consistent with previous research (e.g., Dagnall, 
Drinkwater, et al., 2016).
The chi-square statistic, the standardized root mean square 
residual (SRMR), and root mean square error approximation 
(RMSEA) assessed model fit. For chi-square, a nonsignifi-
cant result is preferred. However, interpretation requires cau-
tion because chi-square is sensitive to sample size and tends 
to overreject good models (Tanaka, 1987). For SRMR and 
RMSEA, values of .05 indicate good fit, values between .06 
and .08 denote satisfactory fit, and .08 to .10 marginal fit 
(Browne & Cudeck, 1993). For reporting RMSEA, the 90% 
confidence interval (90% CI) was included. The comparative 
fit index (CFI) was also used because it is less sensitive to 
sample size, with values greater than .86 indicating marginal 
fit (Bong, Woo, & Shin, 2013), above .90 satisfactory, and .95 
or higher good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Model comparison 
used Akaike information criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974), with 
lower values indicating superior fit.
Descriptive Statistics
Examination of the correlation matrix revealed important 
intermeasure relationships: a weak positive correlation 
between problems (perception of randomness and conjunc-
tion fallacy) and negative associations between emotion-
based reasoning and problems (see Table 1). Relationships 
between beliefs (paranormal and PRS) and statistical bias 
varied as a function of problem type. Specifically, perception 
of randomness significantly negatively correlated with belief 
in the paranormal, but not PRS. Contrastingly, conjunction 
performance correlated negatively with overall belief in the 
paranormal, Traditional Paranormal Beliefs, and PRS.
Overall, perception of randomness was more strongly 
associated with belief in the paranormal and conjunction fal-
lacy with PRS. With regard to paranormal dimensions, only 
Traditional Paranormal Beliefs correlated weakly with PRS. 
Emotion-based reasoning correlated positively with belief in 
the paranormal; there was no association with PRS.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Measurement model assessment involved testing a priori 
scale factor solutions (see Table 2). Previous research indi-
cated that belief in the paranormal, Traditional Paranormal 
Beliefs, and New Age Philosophy (Lange et al., 2000); and 
problems, perception of randomness, and conjunction fallacy 
(Dagnall, Drinkwater, et al., 2016) possessed correlated two-
factor solutions. Thinking style (emotion-based reasoning; 
Peters et al., 2014) and PRS have unidimensional factor 
structures.
Analysis reported unacceptable fit for the Revised 
Paranormal Belief Scale, χ2(102, N = 248) = 669.23, p < 
.001, CFI = .77, SRMR = .08, RMSEA = .15 (90% CI = 
[0.14, 0.16]). This outcome concurred with existing research 
reporting unacceptable to marginal fit for the two-factor 
solution (Dagnall, Drinkwater, et al., 2016). A review of 
modification indices indicated that correlating specific 
within-factor error terms (Items 5 and 12, 7 and 14, 14 and 
21, and 8 and 22) improved fit, χ2(98, N = 248) = 338.44, 
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p < .001, CFI = .90, SRMR = .06, RMSEA = .10 (90% CI = 
[0.09, 0.11]). Allowing error terms to correlate, despite risk-
ing chance capitalization (MacCallum, Roznowski, & 
Necowitz, 1992), aided interpretation because the item com-
binations were consistent with subscales of the original 
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale seven-factor model 
(Tobacyk, 2004), in particular, spiritualism (Items 5 and 12), 
precognition (Items 7, 14, and 21), and traditional religious 
belief (Items 8 and 22). Byrne (2013) cautions against cor-
relating within-factor error terms without a clear justifica-
tion. In this instance, a clear rationale existed.
The correlated two-factor model for statistical bias reported 
satisfactory data–model fit, χ2(34, N = 248) = 49.25, p = .044, 
CFI = .89, SRMR = .06, RMSEA = .04 (90% CI = [0.01, 0.07]). 
Factor loadings revealed that Problem 4 loaded poorly onto 
perception of randomness (loading of .35). Removal of this 
item resulted in a slight improvement in data–model fit, χ2(26, 
N = 248) = 36.76, p = .079, CFI = .92, SRMR = .05, RMSEA = 
.04 (90% CI = [0.01, 0.07]). The one-factor emotional-based 
reasoning model reported good data–model fit, χ2(9, N = 248) 
= 9.86, p = .362, CFI = .99, SRMR = .03, RMSEA = .02 (90% 
CI = [0.01, 0.07]). Similarly, the one-factor model for PRS pos-
sessed satisfactory data–model fit, χ2(31, N = 248) = 95.38, p < 
.001, CFI = .93, SRMR = .05, RMSEA = .08 (90% CI = [0.06, 
0.10]). These findings showed that measures were consistent 
with their underlying theoretical structures. Furthermore, all 
factor loadings were positive and statistically significant, and 
all but three items (Item 23, Revised Paranormal Belief Scale = 
.27; Item 16, emotion-based reasoning = .27; and Item 10, PRS 
= .30) demonstrated factor loadings greater than the minimum 
threshold of .32 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
Reliability Analysis
Traditional measures of internal reliability (i.e., Cronbach’s 
α) typically over- or underestimate scale reliability within a 
latent modeling context; hence, composite reliability provides 
a more rigorous assessment of internal consistency (Raykov, 
2002). Values above .60 are satisfactory (Diamantopoulos & 
Siguaw, 2000). New Age Philosophy and Traditional 
Paranormal Beliefs demonstrated satisfactory composite reli-
ability (ρc = .89 and ρc = .81, respectively), as did emotion-
based reasoning (ρc = .62), and PRS (ρc = .85). Perception of 
randomness and conjunction fallacy had composite reliability 
below .60; however, results were close enough to be deemed 
acceptable (ρc = .57 and ρc = .56, respectively).
Table 1. Scale Descriptive and Intermeasure Correlations.
M SD Proportion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1.  Statistical 
bias
5.75 1.79 .58 .70** .83** −.29** −.30** −.20** −.29** −.22**
2. PR 3.79 1.01 .76 .18** −.21** −.28** −.21** −.27** −.08
3. CF 1.95 1.30 .39 −.23** −.19** −.11* −.19** −.24**
4. EBR 7.51 1.83 .31** .24** .25** −.01
5. RPBS 72.41 29.49 .85** .87** .18**
6. NAP 20.30 5.59 .72** .11*
7. TPB 20.78 5.77 .15*
8. PRS 48.08 11.87  
Note. Statistical bias, overall number of probabilistic reasoning bias problems solved; PR = perception of randomness; CF = conjunction fallacy; 
EBR = emotion-based reasoning; RPBS = Revised Paranormal Belief Scale; NAP = New Age Philosophy; TPB = Traditional Paranormal Beliefs; 
PRS = problem–reaction–solution.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
Table 2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for All Scales.
Model χ2 df CFI SRMR RMSEA (90% CI)
RPBS correlated two factor 669.23** 102 .77 .08 .15 [0.14, 0.16]
RPBS correlated two factor (with correlated errors) 338.44** 98 .90 .06 .10 [0.09, 0.11]
SB correlated two factor 49.25* 34 .89 .06 .04 [0.01, 0.07]
SB correlated two factor (without Problem 4) 36.76 26 .92 .05 .04 [0.01, 0.07]
EBS one factor 9.86 9 .99 .03 .02 [0.01, 0.07]
PRS one factor 95.38** 31 .93 .05 .08 [0.06, 0.10]
Note. χ2 = chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic; df = degrees of freedom; CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root mean square 
residual; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CI = confidence interval; RPBS = Revised Paranormal Belief Scale; SB = statistical bias; 
EBS = emotion-based reasoning; PRS = problem–reaction–solution.
*χ2 significant at p < .05. **χ2 significant at p < .001.
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Model Evaluation
Fit indices for Model 1, Traditional Paranormal Beliefs 
(see Figure 1), revealed satisfactory data–model fit, χ2(392, 
N = 248) = 536.12, p < .001, CFI = .92, SRMR = .06, 
RMSEA = .04 (90% CI = [0.03, 0.05]). Inspection of struc-
tural paths indicated that perception of randomness had a 
significant negative effect on Traditional Paranormal 
Beliefs (β = –.36, p = .002), conjunction fallacy had a sig-
nificant negative effect on PRS (β = –.43, p = .002), and 
emotion-based reasoning had a significant positive effect 
on Traditional Paranormal Beliefs (β = .20, p = .04). 
Emotion-based reasoning demonstrated a significant mod-
erate negative correlation with perception of randomness 
(r = –.36, p = .003) and conjunction (r = –.37, p = .003). 
Perception of randomness revealed a significant positive 
correlation with conjunction fallacy (r = .25, p = .038).
Model 2, New Age Philosophy (see Figure 2), demonstrated 
satisfactory fit, χ2(580, N = 248) = 859.95, p < .001, CFI = .90, 
SRMR = .07, RMSEA = .04 (90% CI = [0.03, 0.05]). Structural 
paths indicated that perception of randomness had a significant 
negative effect on NAP (β = –.37, p < .001), and conjunction 
fallacy had a significant negative effect on PRS (β = –.46, p = 
.002). As with Model 1, emotion-based reasoning demon-
strated a significant moderate negative correlation with 
perception of randomness (r = –.45, p < .001) and conjunction 
fallacy (r = –.41, p = .002). In contrast to Model 1, the observed 
relationship between emotion-based reasoning and paranormal 
belief was not significant (in this instance, New Age 
Philosophy). Perception of randomness and conjunction fal-
lacy were positively correlated, but this relationship was above 
the significance level of .05 (r = .22, p > .05).
Inspection of AIC specified that Model 1 provided supe-
rior data–model fit compared with Model 2 (Model 1, AIC = 
742.12; Model 2, AIC = 1,103.95).
Results supported the notion that although positively 
related, components of statistical bias (perception of ran-
domness and conjunction fallacy) possessed differential rela-
tionships with belief in the paranormal and PRS. Poorer 
performance on perception of randomness tasks predicted 
paranormal belief, but not PRS. Contrastingly, propensity to 
conjunction fallacy explained PRS, but not belief in the para-
normal. Emotion-based reasoning correlated with statistical 
bias and positively predicted Traditional Paranormal Beliefs.
Discussion
Endorsement of PRS scenarios correlated negatively with 
statistical bias; higher levels of PRS validation were associ-
ated with poorer performance on probabilistic reasoning 
Figure 1. Model 1: Relationships of Conjunction Fallacy, Perception of Randomness, and Emotion-Based Reasoning with Traditional 
Paranormal Beliefs and Problem-Reaction-Solution.
Note. Latent variables are represented by ellipses; observed variables are represented by rectangles; error of measurement is indicated by ‘e’.
*p < .05, **p < .001.
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tasks. There was, however, no correlation between PRS and 
emotion-based reasoning (EBR). This differential pattern of 
relationships indicated that PRS substantiation arose from 
the rational appeal of presented propositions rather than their 
affective content. Consideration of individual biases revealed 
that only proneness to conjunction fallacy predicted level of 
PRS endorsement. There was no association between per-
ception of randomness and PRS validation.
The predictive relationship between proneness to con-
junction and PRS suggested that endorsement of PRS solu-
tions derived from the tendency to deduce incorrectly 
reciprocal connections between scenario components (prob-
lem, reaction, and solution). This assertion was supported by 
the fact that respondents reported moderate levels of agree-
ment with proposed solutions (M = 4.81, SD = 1.19). This 
signified that scenarios appeared coherent to the extent that 
the recommended solutions followed logically from the pre-
sented premises. This notion concurred also with Aristotle’s 
Laws of Association (Ross, 2014). Principally, the law of 
contiguity, where ideas or events presented closely in time 
and space seem causally linked.
Clearly, PRS solutions possessed intuitive appeal. The 
issue was that inferences (stated solutions) did not necessar-
ily follow logically from the presented premises. Specifically, 
other conclusions were permissible. Accordingly, PRS 
endorsement represented a form of truncated reasoning or 
bounded rationality, whereby respondents agreed with the 
proposed solution because it provided an “acceptable” solu-
tion to the problem outlined (Simon, 1955). In this sense, 
PRS scenarios mirror real-world dilemmas, where decision 
making and problem solving, due to internal (mental; for 
example, cognitive processing limitations) and external 
constraints (environmental, for example, time), represent a 
mixture of pragmatic expediency. People use best available 
(vs. optimal) solutions because information is incomplete 
and resources are limited. From the perspective of conspir-
acy theorists, ideological bias and selective presentation of 
evidence drive solution advocacy rather than logic 
(Chomsky, 2002).
The inclusion of a measure of paranormal belief alongside 
PRS enabled this article to determine whether the two con-
structs shared conceptual similarities. The reasoning being 
that believers in the paranormal placed less emphasis on 
objective (vs. subjective) evidence when forming conclu-
sions. This study, however, found few, if any, similarities 
between PRS and belief in the paranormal. PRS only weakly 
correlated with belief in the paranormal; the two constructs 
shared 3% variance.
Figure 2. Model 2: Relationships of Conjunction Fallacy, Perception of Randomness, and Emotion-Based Reasoning with New Age 
Philosophy and Problem-Reaction-Solution.
Note. Latent variables are represented by ellipses; observed variables are represented by rectangles; error of measurement is indicated by ‘e’.
*p < .05, **p < .001.
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In contrast to PRS-related findings, perception of ran-
domness best predicted belief in the paranormal, which was 
only associated weakly with conjunction fallacy. This out-
come concurred with earlier studies, which outlined stronger 
relationships between perception of randomness and belief 
in the paranormal (Dagnall, Drinkwater, et al., 2016; Dagnall 
et al., 2014). Congruently, perception of randomness corre-
lated negatively with both New Age Philosophy and 
Traditional Paranormal Beliefs, whereas conjunction prone-
ness correlated only with Traditional Paranormal Beliefs. 
Clearly, PRS endorsement and paranormal belief validation 
derive from different cognitive processes. These findings 
support recent work by Dagnall et al. (2017), which directs 
that specific anomalous beliefs are explained by different 
cognitive-perceptual factors.
The belief in the paranormal findings replicated previous 
work and was consistent with the notion that conjunction (in 
the context of belief in the paranormal) functions as an indi-
rect measure of perception of randomness (Dagnall, 
Drinkwater, et al., 2016; Dagnall et al., 2014; Rogers, 2014), 
explicitly, the view that conjunction fallacy represents a par-
ticular instance of misperception of chance. For example, 
thinking about a friend who simultaneously suddenly rings. 
The inference that this event is paranormal derives from two 
processes: a failure to appreciate probability (misperception 
of randomness) and the attribution of causation to specific 
paranormal forces or powers. The second stage of this pro-
cess manifests as a conjunction fallacy. In this instance, a 
typical paranormal explanation may be that the call arose 
from telepathic communication (extrasensory perception 
[ESP]) between the two people. Hence, conjunction error is 
most likely in situations where attributional processes assign 
event occurrence to “precise” paranormal agents or causes.
Overall, these findings support the notion that propensity 
to statistical bias is predictive of flawed reasoning and belief 
in the paranormal; however, the importance of specific biases 
varies as a function of problem structure and belief type. 
Hence, whereas conjunction error explains PRS endorse-
ment, misperception of randomness best predicts belief in 
the paranormal. This conclusion concurs with recent work on 
validation of conspiracy theories, which established that con-
spiratorial ideation was associated with a domain-general 
susceptibility to conjunction error (Brotherton & French, 
2014; Dagnall et al., 2017). Noting this, subsequent research 
may wish to investigate relationships between PRS endorse-
ment and conspiracy theory acceptance. This would reveal 
whether inclination to conjunction undermines critical 
thought across different applied problem domains. This 
could extend to include consideration of whether “the totali-
tarian tiptoe” (Icke, 2003, 2007) is a legitimate psychologi-
cal phenomenon and determine its relationship with PRS. 
These notions are important because they inform psycho-
logical understanding of how the general population per-
ceives social and political dilemmas and accepts potential 
solutions.
Finally, EBR correlated negatively with statistical bias 
components and positively predicted belief in the paranormal. 
Thus, tendency to statistical bias was concomitant with an 
emotion-based thinking style. In addition, correlations delin-
eated similar associations between EBR and Revised 
Paranormal Belief subscales. The finding that EBR was asso-
ciated with belief in the paranormal was consistent with ear-
lier research. For example, Irwin et al. (2012) observed that 
people typically endorsed paranormal beliefs based on emo-
tional, rather than rational appeal. Similarly, Sappington 
(1990) demonstrated that heightened emotion-based reason-
ing increased participants’ judgment of phenomena as para-
normal. In the context of PRS, the current scenarios may have 
lacked sufficient detail to produce strong affective responses. 
Consequently, future studies could provide additional emo-
tional content. For example, include detailed case studies out-
lining actual instances where issues have caused real-world 
consequences. This would afford a better understanding of 
the role of emotion-based reasoning in PRS scenario process-
ing. An added advantage is that dual-processing models, such 
as cognitive–experiential self-theory (CEST; for example, 
Epstein, 1990) will then be more applicable to PRS. CEST 
differentiates between experiential (subjective) and rational 
(analytical) processing.
Finally, consequent research should examine the degree 
to which PRS links to cognitive-perceptual variables, such 
as illusory causation (the belief that a causal connection 
exists between two unrelated events; Matute et al., 2015) 
and jumping to conclusions (the tendency to make hasty 
decisions; Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988). This will help 
to inform the cognitive-perceptual basis of the  relationship 
between PRS and proneness to conjunction fallacy.
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